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Where Did $MKR Go? Maker Is Now $SKY, and Most Holders Don't Know It If you search for the MKR price today, you'll find a token trading below $0.10 instead of $2,000+. Did Maker crash 99.99%? No. Maker ($MKR) has been rebranded and redenominated as Sky ($SKY). Here is what changed and why it matters. What Is the MKR to SKY Rebrand? In August 2024, MakerDAO, the protocol behind the DAI stablecoin, rebranded as Sky Protocol. Its governance token $MKR was upgraded to $SKY, which is now the only governance token of the Sky ecosystem. The stablecoin was upgraded as well, with DAI converting to USDS at a 1:1 ratio. 1 MKR = 24,000 SKY: The Ratio That Explains Everything: Every MKR converts into 24,000 SKY tokens. This is a redenomination, the same way a company stock split works. Holders receive more units, each unit is worth less, and the total value stays the same. SKY price $0.093 × 24,000 = $2,232 per MKR-equivalent So SKY at $0.093 is effectively MKR at $2,232. That's why the price looks dramatically lower. No value was lost in the conversion. Supply Check: The Numbers Add Up About 977K MKR × 24,000 = about 23.4 billion SKY SKY's total supply of roughly 23.46B matches this calculation. The market cap carried over directly from MKR to SKY. How to Calculate the Real SKY Price in MKR Terms: To compare today's SKY price with historical MKR charts, multiply by 24,000: SKY at $0.093 = about $2,232 MKR-equivalent SKY ATH at $0.1014 = about $2,434 MKR-equivalent SKY is currently trading only about 8% below its ATH. In MKR terms, that puts it back above the $2,200 level. Still Holding MKR? Read This Before You Upgrade: The full-value upgrade window closed in September 2025. If you still hold MKR in a self-custody wallet, late upgrades now carry a delayed-upgrade penalty that increases every quarter. The longer you wait, the less SKY you receive. If your MKR was held on an exchange, most platforms converted balances automatically, so check your SKY balance. Use only the official Sky upgrade portal. Fake migration sites target confused MKR holders. Myth vs Reality: "SKY Is Under $0.10, It Can 100x" This is the most common mistake retail investors make with SKY. A $0.093 price does not mean the token is undervalued. SKY's market cap is about $2.17B, and that number is what determines its potential. A 100x from here would mean a $217B market cap, larger than most of the crypto market. Always value tokens by market cap, not by price per token. Key Takeaways: ➤ MKR is now SKY, and Maker is now Sky Protocol ➤ 1 MKR = 24,000 SKY, which is a redenomination and not a crash ➤ SKY at $0.093 equals about $2,232 per MKR ➤ SKY is trading about 8% below its ATH of $0.1014 ➤ DAI has been upgraded to USDS at a 1:1 ratio ➤ Late MKR upgrades lose value to a quarterly-growing penalty ➤ Use only the official Sky portal to upgrade Note: Don't fall for the biggest myth that $SKY is "cheap" compared to $MKR: at $0.093, SKY equals $2,232 per MKR (1 MKR = 24,000 SKY), which puts it about 10,500% above MKR's 2017 low of $21. DYOR | Not Financial Advice

$GRVT Compound’s $COMP holders are voting on Proposal 612, which would extend treasury withdrawal delays from two days to ten and give the protocol’s Governor Timelock power to cancel treasury transactions before they execute. The voting opened on Sunday and will close on Wednesday (October 7), according to the proposal page. Though the changes may seem technical in nature, the major concern is actually who would take charge of Compound’s treasury. The voting also leads to a much bigger question in DeFi: How much control can be added to a protocol before the better protection begins to indicate centralization? What Proposal 612 changes Proposal 612, submitted by delegate Ugur Mersin on October 2, increases the Treasury Escrow withdrawal cooldown and the minimum delay of the Treasury Timelock from 2 to 10 days. Furthermore, it establishes the period for Escrow expiration at 17 days, which means that there is a 7-day withdrawal period after the cooldown. The proposal says that two of the five actions will assign EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE to the Governor Timelock in relation to the Treasury Timelock. This means that governance can prevent the treasury from performing any operations rather than just reacting after the fact. According to the latest vote count, there are 1.75 million votes in favor of the proposal, compared to 921,000 votes against it, far beyond the quorum of 400,000. The reserve movements that prompted the vote The proposal refers to actions by Compound’s treasury on September 29. The Treasury Management Committee transferred around $3 million in stablecoins to a separate Safe, which then used $2 million in USDC in a single-sided Uniswap V3 $COMP position. Advocates of Proposal 612 claim that the incident demonstrates the need for an enforceable pause in governance, not just a voluntary request. The conflict existed before the action was taken. Cryptopolitan reported that a delegate has made allegations against the Compound Foundation of converting the amount of 8.42 million DAI stored in the DAO reserves into 344,780 $COMP. The delegate also claimed that the resulting voting power was used to influence treasury control and a $52 million V4 program. It is stated that the $COMP was subsequently sent back to its Safe 58 minutes prior to the closing of votes for Proposals 580 and 582. Compound Proposal 612 vote highlights treasury controls and DeFi governance risks

$GRVT TL;DR: 8.42 million DAI allocated under Proposal 536 were allegedly converted into 344,780 COMP tokens through exchange transactions. 58 minutes before voting closed on Proposals 580 and 582, the assets were transferred back to the Safe multisig wallet to delegate voting power. $1.6 billion represents the total value locked (TVL) recorded by Compound Finance on DefiLlama metrics at the time of the complaint. The Compound Foundation was formally accused by delegate Ugurmersin of misappropriating 8.42 million DAI from the Compound DAO reserves to purchase COMP tokens and influence key governance decisions during September 2026. Alleged Misappropriation and Vote Manipulation The formal accusation was published on the decentralized protocol’s official governance forum. The complainant asserts that the funds allocated under Proposal 536 were intended to be safeguarded as operational capital for the community. According to a market report, the approved terms explicitly prohibited speculative use of these assets and mandated that they remain under the exclusive ownership of the decentralized autonomous organization. On-chain records presented by the delegate detail that the 8.42 million DAI were swapped on an exchange for 344,780 COMP tokens. According to Ugurmersin’s analysis, these assets were transferred back to the Safe wallet 58 minutes before voting closed on Proposals 580 and 582. The signers of the multisig treasury allegedly delegated that voting power immediately to the Foundation’s address. The information submitted by the delegate suggests that this technical maneuver enabled the approval of handing over treasury control to the Treasury Management Committee (TMC). It also facilitated the ratification of a Version 4 (V4) development program valued at $52 million. The complaint also mentions the alleged involvement of collaborating entities, including the Compound Growth Working Group, audit firm ChainSecurity, and security provider Certora. The source noted that it has not yet been able to independently verify the transaction records referenced in the allegation, while the Compound Foundation has not released an official statement on the matter. Governance Friction in the DeFi Ecosystem Conflicts surrounding treasury control reflect a persistent challenge within decentralized lending protocols. DefiLlama market data places Compound Finance at approximately $1.6 billion in total value locked and a market capitalization near $230 million, with the COMP token trading around $23 and a direct treasury of $8.26 million as of late September 2026. By comparison, Aave V3 holds more than $18 billion in locked assets. The situation shares direct parallels with the governance dispute seen in Aave in late 2025. During that episode, Aave Chain Initiative founder Marc Zeller claimed that wallets tied to Aave Labs intervened to tip the balance in favor of the “Aave Will Win” proposal, which initially passed with 52.58% support. While the Foundation has not addressed the misappropriation claims, representatives from the implicated groups have recently defended the legitimacy of their operational processes. In a forum post dated September 24, 2026, delegate AranaDigital argued that Snapshot votes serve as a fully legitimate tool for operational efficiency when resolving matters that do not require direct on-chain execution. The complainant confirmed that all on-chain traces and forum screenshots have been preserved publicly, pending formal responses to the delegate community from the technical teams at Certora, ChainSecurity, and the Compound Foundation.

$GRVT The crypto industry often treats a stablecoin depeg as a market anomaly. My position differs: a depeg is an event in settlement infrastructure. The parity of 1 dollar does not hold because of a promise or a chart. It holds because of redemption, collateral, and governance. When one function deteriorates, arbitrage loses correction capacity, and a discount appears. The sector must evaluate stablecoins with counterparty risk criteria, not only market capitalization or volume. Redemption and arbitrage: operational conditions The parity mechanism depends on economic incentives. If a stablecoin trades below 1 dollar, agents buy and redeem with the issuer. If it trades above 1 dollar, agents mint and sell. The process requires open redemption, sufficient liquidity, and confidence in the reserve. When redemption is limited, delayed, or conditional, arbitrage cannot close the gap. Parity stops being a market function and becomes an expectation about issuer solvency. Opacity in redemption is a direct source of depeg. UST and the limit of algorithmic mechanisms The UST case showed a design failure. Algorithmic stability depended on minting LUNA to absorb sell pressure. With insufficient liquidity and reflexivity between both assets, the system entered a negative feedback loop. Governance did not limit growth when coverage did not scale. The lesson for the sector is technical: no algorithmic mechanism replaces liquid collateral and organic demand. Parity requires capital available in stress, not only incentives in normal conditions. USDC and bank risk The USDC case showed bank risk. Parity broke because of Circle exposure to Silicon Valley Bank. Although most of the reserve was in other instruments, uncertainty over 33 billion dollars blocked affected short-term redemption. The depeg was not algorithmic; it was a counterparty risk event and a maturity mismatch. The conclusion for the sector is that reserve transparency must include custody, diversification, and operational access in stress. A quarterly attestation does not cover intraday settlement risk. xUSD, USDX, and strategy risk The xUSD and USDX cases added strategy risk. Stablecoins with yield often use delta-neutral strategies, leverage, and external managers. The investor assumes counterparty risk without complete visibility. When a counterparty reports losses, redemption stops, and a discount appears. My position is that a yield-bearing stablecoin must separate payment function and investment strategy. Mixing both introduces systemic risk into DeFi. Parity should not depend on the yield of an external fund. DeFi composability and contagion DeFi composability amplifies any depeg. Protocols accept stablecoins as collateral, oracles set prices, and liquidations execute automatically. If an asset loses parity, liquidity concentrates in exits, and contagion risk grows. DAI and its PSM illustrate operational dependence: 1:1 convertibility with USDC transmitted tension to an asset with a different design. Composability requires exposure limits, dynamic haircuts, and technical circuit breakers. Without controls, risk propagates through smart contracts before governance reacts. Proof of reserves: scope and limits Proof of reserves is not sufficient if published with delay and without liabilities. A quarterly attestation does not replace daily data on collateral, maturities, and counterparties. For the sector, the minimum standard should include on-chain addresses, reconciliation with custodians, and redemption audit. Transparency reduces information risk and improves market confidence. Proof of reserves must cover asset quality, not only quantity. A reserve with duration risk can fail liquidity even when nominal value is correct. Duration risk and reserve composition A reserve with short-term Treasury bills has lower duration risk than a portfolio with longer-term bonds. Liquidity in stress does not depend only on nominal value. It depends on market depth, counterparty haircuts, and access to liquidity facilities. If the issuer must sell assets at a discount to meet redemptions, collateral can fall below 100 percent. Liability management is as relevant as asset management. Parity requires matching between redemption and available liquidity. Governance and operational control Governance defines the risk profile. Who can change collateral, pause redemption, or alter fees determines holder exposure. Contracts with admin keys without timelock or multisig introduce operational risk. Decentralization must be measured in treasury control, contract upgrades, and dispute resolution. A depeg can originate in a governance decision, not only in market conditions. Verifiable governance is a security component for stablecoins. Liquidity of last resort Arbitrage requires capital and access. In stress, market makers reduce exposure, and spreads widen. If redemption has limits, KYC requirements, or time windows, arbitrage cannot close the gap. Parity depends on liquidity of last resort. For the sector, redemption should be programmatic, predictable, and documented. Opacity in redemption is a direct source of depeg. Liquidity is not improvised in a bank run; it is designed in governance. Oracles and liquidations in protocols Oracles introduce market risk and manipulation risk. A deviated price can trigger unnecessary liquidations or failed arbitrage. Protocols should use medians from multiple sources, time windows, and deviation limits. Automatic liquidation without circuit breakers can amplify depeg and contagion. Oracle governance is part of stablecoin security. Composability requires price standards, not only audited contracts. Stress tests and continuous monitoring Risk management must be continuous. Stress tests with bank run scenarios, maturity mismatch, and collateral decline are necessary. Oracles need fallbacks and deviation limits. Protocols should apply dynamic haircuts and caps per issuer. Composability multiplies risk, but also allows real-time monitoring. The industry has tools; implementation discipline is missing. Parity is sustained by processes, not by declarations. Regulation can require high-quality reserves, custody segregation, and periodic disclosure. My position is that the industry should not wait for mandates to adopt verifiable practices. A redemption standard should publish timelines, limits, fees, and rights in stress. Governance transparency should include collateral changes and contract pauses. Trust is built with auditable data, not with corporate communication. Parity is an operational commitment. What the crypto sector should demand Issuers should publish reserve composition, duration, custodians, and redemption rights. Users should evaluate counterparty risk, not only market capitalization. Developers should integrate limits and depeg alerts. Regulators should require segregation and audit. Parity is an outcome of governance, liquidity, and transparency. Without governance, liquidity, and transparency, 1 dollar is an expectation, not a guarantee. The crypto industry should set standards before a crisis imposes them. Cost of inaction The cost of a depeg is not limited to a temporary discount. It includes liquidations in DeFi, losses in lending protocols, contagion to DAI, and liquidity exits on exchanges. The industry pays with market fragmentation and a risk premium on new stablecoins. Users pay with capital loss and redemption time. Developers pay with technical debt and emergency patches. Prevention has a cost, but systemic risk has a greater cost. Stablecoin depeg is a financial infrastructure event. Parity breaks when redemption, collateral, and governance fail at the same time. The crypto sector must abandon the idea that arbitrage and confidence are sufficient. Stability is designed with verifiable reserves, liquidity, and clear rules. The next stablecoin crisis will be defined by issuer settlement capacity, not by exchange price. The industry must act before the market imposes costs.